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Clearing Civil Procedural Hurdles in the Quest for Justice
SUZETTE M. MALVEAUX*
I. INTRODUCTION
Is there a crisis in the legal profession for civil litigants challenging
systemic discrimination and other corporate misconduct? While it may not
have reached epidemic proportions, plaintiffs are facing greater challenges
bringing civil rights and consumer cases because of procedural hurdles in
the civil litigation system. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are neutral,
and therefore the interpretation and application of those rules strikes us as
fair. However, upon further examination, it becomes clear that procedural
mechanisms can act as barriers to justice, as hurdles that deny due process if
they are too high to clear. This is the potential crisis that may be looming
on the horizon.
There are three areas in which this is taking place. First, claimants are
facing a tougher time getting access to the federal courts because the criteria
for a complaint to survive dismissal have become more difficult. It is
harder to get your foot in the courthouse door. Second, plaintiffs who want
to bring their case with others as a class action are finding this more
challenging. Clearing this procedural hurdle is important because for many
employees and consumers-with little resources and small claims-being
able to act collectively is the only effective way of challenging systemic
discrimination or companywide misconduct. There is strength in numbers.
Third, more every-day Americans are being forced to have an arbitrator,
rather than a judge, resolve their disputes through mandatory arbitration
agreements in form contracts. Having access to a judge and the civil
litigation process provides important procedural protections and features not
available in arbitration. Therefore, it is important that parties entering
agreements to arbitrate truly understand and consent to such arrangements.
Each of these procedural hurdles presents an access to justice issue and
alone would present a formidable challenge for plaintiffs. But the
* Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
Much gratitude goes to the Ohio Northern University Claude W. Pettit College of Law for inviting me to
present at the 34th Annual Law Review Symposium, "Crisis in the Legal Profession," Carhart Program
in Legal Ethics. A special thanks goes to my Research Fellow Christina K. Setlow and Research Assis-
tant Cara Swan for their excellent research and editorial assistance, and to Dean and Professor Veryl V.
Miles and the Columbus School of Law for their generous funding of this project. This article is dedi-
cated to my daughter, Nailah Harper-Malveaux, whose commitment to justice eclipses my own.
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confluence of them threatens to make these procedural hurdles
insurmountable; indeed, signals the beginning of a crisis in the legal
profession.
II. PLEADING YOUR CASE TO GET INTO COURT'
For over half a century, federal courts have opened their doors to all
plaintiffs who could craft a complaint that provided basic notice to the
defendant of their claims. This threshold, called "notice pleading," was
established by the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson2 -a civil rights case
brought by African-American railway workers challenging their union for
failing to fairly represent their interests without regard to race. This seminal
case established the rule that a complaint should only be dismissed if the
plaintiff could "prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief." This made it easy for plaintiffs to initiate a lawsuit
because the system was designed to test the merits of plaintiffs' cases later
on, once both sides had the chance to collect evidence through the discovery
process and use other pre-trial procedures. It was important not to let
procedural gamesmanship bar ordinary people from seeking justice and
relief through the courts.
Anchored in these principles, the Supreme Court consistently rejected
efforts by the lower courts to raise the pleading standard in civil rights
cases. 4 The Court remained steadfast in enforcing Conley 's "no set of facts"
standard, only requiring plaintiffs to set forth a "short and plain statement of
the claim" that would give the defendant notice, as stated in Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 It was important to give civil rights
complainants, like everyone else, their day in court and let their cases be
decided on the merits.
After more than fifty years, however, this generous pleading standard
upon which courts had historically relied came to an abrupt halt. In Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 6 an antitrust class action by consumers against
Internet and telephone service providers, the Supreme Court "retired"
1. This Section is based on a prior issue publication: Suzette M. Malveaux, Salvaging Civil
Rights Claims: How Plausibility Discovery Can Help Restore Federal Court Access After Twombly and
lqbal, AM. CONST. SOC'Y FOR LAW AND POL'Y ISSUE BRIEF (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Malveaux%20issue%20brieP/20%2OFed%20Access%20afte%
20Twombly.pdf.
2. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
3. Id. at 45-46.
4. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-514 (2002); Leatherman v. Tar-
rant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
5. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-47; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
6. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007).
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Conley's permissive "no set of facts" language.' Instead of requiring
plaintiffs to put forth facts showing their claims were possible, they now
had to put forth facts showing their claims were plausible.8 In Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,9 a constitutional civil rights case by Javaid Iqbal against top
government officials, the Court clarified that the new standard applies to all
civil actions, including discrimination claims.10 And the way a judge would
determine if something is plausible would be to use his "judicial experience
and common sense.""
Today, all plaintiffs must clear this higher hurdle to get into federal
court. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern civil actions in
federal court, apply to all cases in the same manner, regardless of the
substantive right being pursued. In other words, the rules are trans-
substantive. But surviving this new bar may be particularly formidable for
civil rights plaintiffs. One of the problems with the higher pleadings bar is
the harsher impact it may have on plaintiffs challenging discrimination.
Intentional discrimination claims, in particular, are more vulnerable to
dismissal following Twombly and Iqbal for numerous reasons.
First, a plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination in her complaint
often tells a story whose facts are consistent with both legal and illegal
behavior; it could go either way. This is not surprising because at the very
beginning of a lawsuit plaintiffs can only put forward information that they
were able to gather through their own diligent investigation. No one has
had a chance to engage in the formal discovery process, where the parties
are compelled to turn over important information to the other side. But
under the new pleading standard, plaintiffs must allege facts "plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with)" illegal conduct.' 2
This makes it tricky for civil rights claims to survive dismissal. If a
plaintiff alleges intentional discrimination, she ultimately has to prove that
the defendant's adverse action was because of some impermissible factor;
the plaintiff has to prove what motivated the defendant. But a defendant's
conduct can suggest a discriminatory motive or a purely innocent one-
indistinguishable from each other at the early pleading stage. For example,
an applicant may not have been hired because of her gender (i.e., an
illegitimate reason) or her poor qualifications (i.e., a legitimate reason).
7. Id. 550 U.S. at 562-63.
8. Id. at 557-63.
9. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
10. Id. at 1953.
I1. Id. at 1950 (citing lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007)).
12. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
2011] 623
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Until there has been some discovery, the facts available to the plaintiff may
be consistent with both theories.
This was true in Iqbal. Javaid Iqbal was detained and held on various
charges immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks because of his
designation as a person of "high interest."13  Iqbal, a Pakistani who
ultimately pled guilty to criminal charges and served his time, alleged that
he had been mistreated by federal officials while in a special, maximum
security unit, in violation of his constitutional rights.14  In particular, he
contended that former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director
Robert Mueller designated him a person of "high interest" and subjected
him to harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or
national origin in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments., His
complaint alleged that these constitutional violations were a matter of policy
for which Ashcroft and Mueller were personally responsible.16  Iqbal's
factual allegations were consistent with both illegal and legal conduct.' 7
The facts could explain invidious discrimination on the one hand, or
legitimate anti-terrorism activity on the other.'8 At the pleading stage,
without the benefit of discovery, it was too early to tell.' 9
Second, the new plausibility test--determined by "judicial experience
and common sense"-is so subjective that it fails to give judges enough
guidance on how to determine if a complaint should be dismissed. 2 0 Based
on differences among judges, one judge may dismiss a complaint while
another concludes that it survives, solely because of the way each judge
applies his or her "judicial experience and common sense." This is bound
to create unpredictability, lack of uniformity, and confusion.
For example, studies indicate that there are significant differences in
perception among racial groups over the existence and pervasiveness of race
discrimination. 2 1 With the election of Barack Obama, the first African-
13. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942-44.
14. Id. at 1942-1945.
15. Id. at 1944.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1959-60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
18. 1qbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-52 (majority opinion).
19. Id. at 1953-54.
20. See id. at 1950.
21. See Kevin Sack & Janet Elder, Appendix, The New York Times Poll on Race: Optimistic
Outlook But Enduring Racial Division, in How RACE IS LIVED IN AMERICA: PULLING TOGETHER,
PULLING APART 385 (2001) (forty-four percent of African-Americans believe they are treated less fairly
than whites in the workplace, while seventy-three percent of whites believe African-Americans are
treated fairly); Gary Langer & Peyton M. Craighill, Fewer Call Racism a Major Problem Though Dis-
crimination Remains, ABC NEWS, Jan. 18, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/Politic
s/story?id=6674407&page=1 ("[African-Americans] remain twice as likely as whites to call racism a big
problem (44 percent vs. 22 percent), and only half as likely to say African-Americans have achieved
624 [Vol. 37
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American President, there has been a particularly acute focus on whether
American society has become "post-racial."22 Following this historic
election, many Americans have concluded that race discrimination is no
23longer a significant issue.23 Consequently, some judges, like many other
Americans, may operate from the presumption that race discrimination is a
thing of the past. This perception may lead to a judge concluding that,
based on the facts before him, intentional discrimination is implausible,
especially in light of other alternative explanations available. Without a
suitable legal standard in which to anchor the plausibility determination,
judges are vulnerable to the perception that their decisions are based on
factors outside of the law. This excessive subjectivity can result in different
outcomes depending not on the facts but on who the judge is.
In Iqbal itself, the Supreme Court concluded that the factual allegations,
24
taken as true, were consistent with intentional illegal discrimination. The
arrest and detention of thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of the FBI's
post-9/ 11 terrorism investigation could mean that Ashcroft and Mueller
intentionally designated such detainees as persons of "high interest" on the
grounds of race, religion, or national origin.2 5 But a more benign reason
could explain the same conduct: i.e., Ashcroft and Mueller instituted a
legitimate anti-terrorism policy that happened to have a disparate impact on
Arab Muslim men because of the connection between the 9/11 attack and its
equality."); K.A. DIXON ET AL., A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: How AMERICANS VIEW DISCRIMINATION
AND RACE ON THE JOB 8 (2002), available at http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/content/
A WorkplaceDivided.pdf (finding that African-American employees are five times more likely than
their white counterparts to believe that African-Americans are the most likely victims of discrimination;
fifty percent of African-American employees believe employment practices are fair, in comparison to
ninety percent of their white counterparts).
22. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in
the Age ofObama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2010).
23. See id. at 1066-67 ("Partly through colorblindness and partly through the accumulated weight
of cultural beliefs and historical practices, most Americans accept that major American institutions are
race-neutral and that these institutions produce vast racial disparities"); see also Debate on Race Emerg-
es as Obama's Policies Take Shape (PBS television broadcast Sept. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/j uly-dec09/rage_09-16.html. (In a discussion among column-
ists and academics with Gwen Ifill, Democratic pollster Cornell Belcher concluded: "We're two very
different countries racially, where right now you have a majority of whites who, frankly, do think we're
post-racial because they think African-Americans have the same advantages as they do, while African-
Americans do not. And you have a large swath of whites right now who are just as likely to see reverse
discrimination as an issue as classic discrimination"); but see The Associated Press, Ex-President Sees
Racism in Outburst, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2009, at Al4 (attributing Joe Wilson's outburst during Presi-
dent Obama's health care speech as "based on racism" and noting that "[t]here is an inherent feeling
among many in this country that an African-American should not be president"); Jeffrey M. Jones,
Majority of Americans Say Racism Against Blacks Widespread, GALLUP, Aug. 4, 2008, available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/109258/Majority-Americans-Say-Racism-Against-Blacks-Widespread.aspx.
24. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 ("Taken as true, these allegations are consistent with petitioners'
purposefully designating detainees 'of high interest' because of their race, religion, or national origin.").
25. Id.
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26perpetrators. In comparing the plaintiffs intentional discrimination theory
to the defendants' more innocent one, the Court rejected the plaintiffs as
implausible on the grounds that it was less likely.27 But a court is not
supposed to weigh the relative merits of alternative theories at the pleading
stage before both parties have had an opportunity to collect evidence to
prove their case. These kinds of judgment calls are to be made by a jury
after everyone has had a chance to gather evidence and make their case.
Finally, discriminatory intent is often difficult, if not impossible, to
unearth before the parties have had some discovery. One reason for this is
that discrimination has become more subtle and institutional. It can be
harder to detect because it is less overt and transparent; instead it takes the
form of stereotypes and unconscious bias.
Another reason it is hard for plaintiffs to unearth discrimination is
because of the unequal access the parties have to evidence. In the absence
of discovery, it is particularly difficult for civil rights claims to survive
dismissal when plaintiffs cannot get access to information that is
exclusively in the defendant's possession, such as defendant's intent or
institutional practices. This unequal access to information-informational
inequality-between the parties is unfair. A good illustration of this was
found in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 28 There, the plaintiff,
Lilly Ledbetter, brought suit against her employer, Goodyear, well after the
statute of limitations had expired because she was not aware of her
employer's initial discriminatory decision to pay her less than her male
colleagues. 2 9 Not surprisingly, like so many employees, she was not privy
to the fact that she was being systematically underpaid 3o-an inequity that
did not escape Congress. 3 1 Other informational inequities include a plaintiff
beaten up by a police officer who is unable to know the officer's identity to
survive a section 1983 claim and an African-American couple steered by a
real estate agent to predominantly Black neighborhoods who are unable to
know the agent's motive to survive a Fair Housing Act claim. In numerous
ways, ordinary people are at a significant disadvantage when challenging




28. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 641-42 (2007) (holding plaintiffs
claim was barred because of the statute of limitations).
29. Id. at 621-24.
30. Id. at 650-51 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
31. The effect of this holding was ultimately reversed by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42
U.S.C.).
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Plaintiffs are caught in a Catch-22. They must put facts in their
complaint to nudge their claim from possible to plausible. Often the only
way to get such facts is through discovery. But the court will not permit
discovery unless the plaintiffs provide the very facts they cannot discover.
Thus, plaintiffs' complaints die on the vine not because they lack merit, but
because plaintiffs do not have the same access to information that the
defendant does. By raising the pleading bar to plausibility, the Supreme
Court has created an untenable situation for plaintiffs challenging
discrimination where there is informational inequality.
The fact that civil rights cases run the risk of being dismissed more
often in federal courts is a major problem. This risk undermines civil rights
enforcement and compromises deterrence. Pursuant to the legislative
scheme of various civil rights statutes, everyday people are empowered to
act as private attorneys general to enforce the law. The federal courts, in
particular, have historically been a forum civil rights plaintiffs have relied
on for justice. Where the legislative and executive branches have been
unwilling or unable to enforce civil rights, the judicial branch has stepped in
to play a vital role.
Defendants are more likely to file motions to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, post-Twombly and Iqbal.32  Moreover, examples of civil rights
cases that would not have otherwise been dismissed but for Twombly and
Iqbal have appeared across the country. 3 3  Empirical studies on Twombly
and Iqbal's impact on the dismissal rate of civil rights cases, however, have
been mixed. A number of scholars have found that the more rigorous
32. Joe S. Cecil et al., Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal: Report to the
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 8 (Mar. 2011),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf.
33. See Joshua Civin & Debo P. Adegbile, Restoring Access to Justice: The Impact of lqbal and
Twombly on Federal Civil Rights Litigation, AM. CONST. SOC'Y FOR LAW AND POL'Y ISSUE BRIEF 9-10
(Sept. 2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/defaultfiles/Civin Adegbile lqbalTwombly.pdf;
Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the
Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 65, 86 n.137 (2010)
(citing examples) [hereinafter Front Loading]. See, e.g., Diaz-Martinez v. Miami-Dade County, No. 07-
20914-CIV, 2009 WL 2970468, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2009) (relying on Twombly, the court dis-
missed the section 1983 claim for conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights on grounds that alle-
gations of parallel constitutional violations alone did not suggest an agreement between police defend-
ants, and discovery was not appropriate); Dorsey v. Ga. Dep't of State Rd. & Tollway Auth. SRTA, No.
1:09-CV-1 182-TWT, 2009 WL 2477565, at *5-7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2009) (dismissing § 1983 hostile
work environment claim and others on grounds that plausibility standard under Twombly was not met
under Rule 12(c) motion on the pleadings); Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA,
2009 WL 2246194, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009) (dismissing claims of discrimination on basis of
national origin, religious beliefs, and other constitutional violations because plaintiff did not show dis-
criminatory purpose under lqbal); Kyle v. Holinka, No. 09-cv-90-sc, 2009 WL 1867671, at * 1-3 (W.D.




pleading standard is resulting in a greater dismissal rate for such cases.34
The Federal Judicial Center, on the other hand, has not, at a statistically
significant level. Practitioners reveal that they have changed their
pleadings practices when possible to accommodate the more rigorous
pleading standard,36 while others have been chilled or discouraged from
bringing potentially meritorious cases altogether.37
The tougher pleading standard also undermines one of the most
fundamental rights upon which the American legal system is based-the
right to be heard. The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance
of this value, as expressed in the Constitution: "The due process clause
requires that every man shall have the protection of his day in court, and the
benefit of the general law, a law which hears before it condemns[." 3 8
Depriving someone of access to the court system undermines fundamental
notions of fairness and due process that are the cornerstones of our legal
system. Moreover, denying plaintiffs access to the courts undermines the
well-established preference that cases be decided on the merits rather than
on procedural grounds. Whenever possible, the merits should not be
subordinated to procedural technicalities.
Finally, the plausibility pleading standard's potentially detrimental
impact on civil rights claims and claimants may lead individuals to call into
question the legitimacy of the legal system. Where some victims of
34. See Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1838 (2008) ("[A] Twombly
civil rights action was 39.6% more likely to be dismissed than a random case in the set."); Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553,
556 (2010) (dismissal orders in civil rights cases increased from 53% to 56% to 60%, two years before
Twombly, two years after Twombly, and immediately following lqbal respectively); Joseph A. Seiner,
The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009
U. ILL. L. REv. 1011, 1030, 1041-42 (2009) (2% increase in dismissal rate of employment discrimina-
tion cases post-Twombly).
35. See Cecil, et al., supra note 32, at vii (finding "no increase in the rate of grants of motions to
dismiss without leave to amend in civil rights cases and employment discrimination cases[.]").
36. See Emery G. Lee Ill & Thomas E. Willging, Attorney Satisfaction with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 12 (Mar. 2010),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv2.pdf/$file/costciv2.pdf [hereinafter LEE &
WILLGING, SATISFACTION] (Seventy percent of plaintiffs' attorneys who had filed an employment dis-
crimination case since Twombly indicated that they had changed the way they structured complaints, and
ninety-four percent of those attorneys shared that they included more factual allegations in the complaint
post-Twombly and lqbal).
37. See Civin & Adegbile, supra note 33, at 9.
38. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)
("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard."); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]here is intrinsic value in the due
process right to be heard" because "[w]hatever its outcome, such a hearing represents a valued human
interaction in which the affected person experiences at least the satisfaction of participating in the deci-
sion that vitally concerns her[.]").
628 [Vol. 37
CLEARING CIVIL PROCEDURAL HURDLES
injustice are selectively excluded and denied the law's benefits, they may
view the legal system as illegitimate and unworthy of respect.
In response to these problems, numerous scholars, practitioners, and
advocacy groups have generated a variety of innovative and promising
potential solutions. They include legislation that would turn the clock back
to the notice pleading standard,39 amendments to the Federal Rules, and
various other approaches. 4o Many are collecting data and studying the
issue, including the Federal Judicial Center, the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee, and various academics. 4' These efforts to construct a
permanent, institutional fix to the pleadings problem are laudable and
important work.
Even some courts are dialing back from what initially seemed a rigid
pleadings approach and bleak picture for the viability of civil rights cases.
More specifically, some federal courts of appeals are emphasizing a
flexible, context-specific approach whose leniency is dependent on the
circumstances.42 Some are permitting pleading "upon information and
belief' when appropriate, and liberally granting leave to amend.43
The Supreme Court itself recently reminded litigants of the relative ease
with which pleadings can be brought in Skinner v. Switzer, citing pre-
Twombly and Iqbal case law. Unfortunately, not much can be read into
Skinner. While Skinner reiterates Rule 8's requirement that only a short and
plain statement of a claim is necessary, and reminds the lower courts that a
plaintiff need not pin down his precise legal theory at the pleadings stage or
give an "exposition of his legal argument," the Court still requires that
plaintiff set forth a plausible claim.45
More recently, in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,46 the Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed the Ninth Circuit's reversal of a securities
fraud class action dismissed at the pleading stage.47 However, the Court's
39. Open Access to Courts Act, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009); Notice Pleading Restoration
Act, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).
40. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 95-105 (2010) (comparing rulemaking and legislative options).
41. See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011)
(providing empirical data challenging assumptions regarding benefits and costs of the heightened plead-
ing standard).
42. See Cecil, et al., supra note 32, at 2-3.
43. Id.; Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman on a Review of Case Law Applying Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. lqbal to Civil Rules Comm. and Standing Rules Comm. 4-5, 35 (July
26, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/lqbal-memo072610.
pdf.
44. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011).
45. Id.
46. 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
47. Id. at 1313-14.
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holding that plaintiffs adequately pled the elements of materiality and
scienter-while good for investors alleging violations of section 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 1Ob-5-is too specific to offer any broad pleadings
lessons.48 In Matrixx, the Court concluded that plaintiffs adequately stated a
claim for securities fraud under the federal securities laws, based on the
pharmaceutical company's failure to disclose reports of adverse events of its
nasal spray Zicam to investors.49 Even though the reports did not disclose a
statistically significant number of adverse events-that was not necessary
for investors to consider the reports "material."5 0 Applying Twombly and
Iqbal's plausibility standard, the Court concluded that plaintiffs had alleged
facts plausibly suggesting that reasonable investors would have considered
the reports material to their investment decisions, and that Matrixx acted
with the requisite state of mind to defraud investors.5' Although relying on
Twombly and Iqbal's plausibility paradigm, the Court required plaintiffs to
plead with greater factual particularity because their claims were brought
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.52 Thus, Matrixx's
general applicability may be limited.
The various efforts being made for private actors to maintain court
access are constructive and should continue. However, in the absence of a
change in the Federal Rules or Congressional action-which may be
months if not years away-it is imperative that civil rights litigators figure
out how they can use the tools currently available to them to fight for access
to the courts and continued enforcement of the civil rights statutes. So what
can be done in the meantime? One such alternative is "plausibility
discovery." 53 Plausibility discovery is limited, targeted discovery made
available to the parties at the pleading stage in response to a defendant's
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the grounds that a plaintiffs claims are
implausible. 54 Plaintiffs should consider requesting plausibility discovery
and courts should consider granting it where there is informational
asymmetry between the parties. Adapting discovery in this way would level
the playing field for civil rights claimants and ensure that the trans-
substantive application of the Rules does not work an injustice against civil
48. See id. at 1322, 1325.
49. Id. at 1314.
50. Id. at 1319-20.
51. Id. at 1322-25.
52. Id. at 1324.
53. See Malveaux, Front Loading, supra note 33, at 65.
54. See Malveaux, Front Loading, supra note 33, at 65.
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rights claims. Plausibility discovery is gaining some traction, 5 thereby
offering hope to those just trying to get through the courthouse door.
III. CLEARING THE CLASS ACTION HURDLE
Assuming a case survives dismissal, the next procedural hurdle an
employee may face is whether she can bring her case with others as a class
action. Clearing this procedural hurdle is important because, for many
employees and consumers, being able to act collectively is the only
effective way of challenging systemic discrimination or companywide
misconduct.
For numerous reasons, the class action mechanism cannot otherwise be
matched. As an initial matter, an employer can more easily mask
discrimination when challenged on an individual basis than on a class-wide
basis. For example, statements from management, corporate documents,
and companywide statistics can unearth trends and powerful evidence of a
larger problem. Consequently, plaintiffs in class actions can craft remedies
and injunctive relief far greater in scope than in an individual case. Such
evidence also puts others on notice of potential deceptive practices of which
they may not have been aware. Moreover, the class action enables
individuals to pool their resources, which allows them to share litigation
risks and burdens, and more easily retain counsel for small value claims. In
the absence of aggregate litigation, an employee may also be too fearful of
retaliation to challenge her employer; the class action creates a more level
playing field between an employer and employee. If the plaintiffs
successfully prove a pattern or practice of discrimination, the burden of
proof shifts in favor of the plaintiffs in a Title VII class action. Each class
member enjoys a rebuttable presumption that she was the victim of the
discrimination, subject to the employer's ability to prove otherwise.
Furthermore, private class actions bolster enforcement by government
agencies-such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") and others-who may be financially or politically hampered in
bringing pattern or practice cases. Congress has explicitly recognized this
enforcement function for Title VII and other claims. Additionally,
potential class-wide liability encourages companies to voluntarily comply
with the law and deters future misconduct. Finally, the class action
55. See, e.g., Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 412 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) ("If the plaintiff shows that he can't conduct an even minimally adequate investigation without
limited discovery, the judge presumably can allow that discovery, meanwhile deferring ruling on the
defendant's motion to dismiss.") (citations omitted); Miller, supra note 40, at 109 n.422.
56. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,426 (1971) ("Congress provided, in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, for class actions for enforcement of provisions of the Act [.]").
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mechanism provides an efficient means of resolving similar individual
claims all in one lawsuit-relieving the federal courts of repetitive
individual litigation and providing defendants with global peace. In sum,
this procedural device plays an important and unique role in the civil justice
system.
Although aggregate litigation offers enumerable benefits, it is not
without its detractors. Such mammoth litigation, while rare, has caused
others-particularly those in the business community-to criticize its
power. More specifically, given the tremendous risk of financial exposure
class actions create, defendants argue that certification is akin to blackmail
and makes the pressure to settle irresistible. Critics argue that unrelated
individual cases are inappropriately lumped together in one case, making it
impossible for companies to adequately defend themselves against
individual claims.57 Not only are class actions unpopular with companies,
they may also be for some plaintiffs. Plaintiffs with very strong claims may
do better bringing their cases individually, and enjoy a process that is faster
and more inclusive. The perception that class members gain little from
coupon and other class settlements, while plaintiffs' lawyers garner
significant fees, became so prevalent that Congress enacted the Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA") in 2005 to provide more rigorous checks and
balances. CAFA also liberalized federal jurisdiction for class actions, in
response to complaints that some state courts ("judicial hellholes") did not
exercise sufficient rigor when deciding class certification. 59  This has
resulted in an increase in class actions in federal court based on diversity of
citizenship. 60 In sum, class action critics have pushed back-with various
57. See, e.g., Brief of DRI-The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, at 7-9, 14, 17, 19, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277) (Jan. 27,
2011); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of Petitioner, at 4,
6, 16-19, 21-22, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277) (Jan. 2011).
58. See Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 102-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Congress also enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("PSLRA"), which, among other things, gave judges the authority to select large institutional
investors, rather than individual investors, and plaintiffs' counsel to represent a class in a federal securi-
ties fraud class action. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A.). In 1998, the federal class
action rule itself was amended to codify the regulation of attorneys' fees (Rule 23(h)) and selection of
class counsel (Rule 23(g)). See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23.
59. See generally EMERY G. LEE Ill & THOMAS E. WILLGING, The Impact of the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 on the Federal Courts: Fourth Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (Apr. 2008), available at www.fjc.gov/public/pdf
.nsf/lookup/cafaO4O8.pdf/$file/cafaO4O8.pdf.
60. See Kenneth Jost, Class Action Lawsuits, CQ RESEARCHER, May 13, 2010 at 448; see also
LEE & WILLGING, supra note 59.
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degrees of success-on the class action, seeing it as a flawed and misused
procedural device.
A particularly serious challenge to employees attempting to curb
systemic discrimination is whether they can seek monetary relief, as well as
injunctive relief, in a class action brought under Rule 23(b)(2)-the class
action rule often used in civil rights cases. The Supreme Court is wrestling
with this very question now6 1 in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.62 -a case
involving up to 1.5 million women alleging nationwide pay and promotions
gender discrimination at Wal-Mart. 63
Like many employees who challenge companywide discrimination, the
plaintiffs in Dukes brought their case as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.64 Rule 23(b)(2) allows a class
action where "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole[.]"65 Because everyone is challenging the same companywide policy
or general practice, the court permits named plaintiffs to represent the larger
group.66 Additionally, because everyone shares the same primary goal-
which is to stop the discrimination-the lawyers are not required to send out
notice to the class members or give them an opportunity to opt out of the
case. While normally one's interest cannot be represented without giving
one's consent, this mandatory class action is permitted because of the
cohesiveness and homogeneity of the class. Not surprisingly, this is exactly
the type of class action that is very popular for civil rights cases.67 In fact,
the rule was designed for this type of case, as indicated by the drafters in
681966. As would be expected, the plaintiffs in Dukes sought an injunction
to stop Wal-Mart's alleged discriminatory policy and a declaration that the
company's conduct was illegal.69
61. The case was decided as this article was going to press. This article is based on remarks
made on March 20, 2011, at the 34th Annual Law Review Symposium, "Crisis in the Legal Profession,"
Carhart Program in Legal Ethics.
62. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 795
(Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277).
63. See id. at 578 n.3.
64. Id. at 577; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
66. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 613-14. In addition, in order for a case to be certified as a class action in
federal court, all of the criteria of Rule 23(a) must be met. Rule 23(a) requires numerosity, commonali-
ty, typicality and adequacy of representation. In addition to the four Rule 23(a) criteria, every class
action must meet one of the Rule 23(b)(2) criteria. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. In Dukes, the Ninth Circuit
certified the class action under Rule 23(b)(2), so the issue is whether this was proper.
67. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (amended 1966).
69. Dukes, 603 F. 3d at 577.
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One of the questions at issue in Dukes, however, is the significance of
plaintiffs seeking monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(2).70 Plaintiffs sought
two types of monetary relief: back pay and punitive damages.71 Back pay
includes lost wages and salary, benefits and other monetary benefits lost due
to discrimination. Back pay is designed to put a victim of discrimination
back in his or her rightful place, to make the person whole. Back pay can
easily be calculated using a formula based on an employer's personnel data.
Punitive damages are awarded to plaintiffs for particularly serious
situations; i.e. when a defendant has carried out discrimination with "malice
or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual."72 The focus of punitive damages is on the defendant's conduct;
punitive damages are meant to punish the defendant and deter from future
misconduct. Notably, the Dukes plaintiffs chose not to pursue
compensatory damages, which compensate individuals for "emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and
other non-pecuniary losses" 7 3 resulting from discrimination. 7 4  Such
damages often need to be determined through hearings on an individualized
basis.
The question before the Supreme Court is whether any monetary relief
is permitted under Rule 23(b)(2), and if so, under what circumstances. The
answer to the first question is yes. Although the rule is silent about
monetary relief-it does not say whether such relief is prohibited or
allowed-the Rule's drafters (the Civil Rules Advisory Committee) make
clear that they did not intend to ban all forms of monetary relief, but only a
subset-damages that are exclusive or predominant.75  The drafters
contemplated that some monetary relief would be permitted for this
mandatory class action, so long as the monetary relief did not predominate
over the injunctive relief sought.76 Not surprisingly, all of the courts of
appeals that have addressed this question came to the same conclusion.n
Relying on the Advisory Committee's notes, they have all concluded that
non-predominant monetary relief is available-which makes this
proposition well-settled law.
70. Id.at616-17.
71. Id. at 577.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2011) (enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991)).
73. Id. § 198la(b)(3).
74. See Dukes, 603 F. 3d at 577.
75. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
76. See id.
77. See Dukes, 603 F. 3d at 619.
78. See id.
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So the fundamental question left is under what circumstances monetary
relief is available under the rule. This depends largely on what type of
monetary relief is sought because the courts deal with petitions for Rule
23(b)(2) certification differently on this ground. For example, courts have
historically permitted back pay in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions to enforce
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 79 This is because back pay is usually
considered equitable relief; back pay stems from a class-wide liability
finding and from the injunctive and declaratory relief sought. As an
equitable remedy, back pay is awarded by a judge, not a jury. The courts
have favored back pay in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions for decades as part of
Title VII's broad remedial scheme.80 Back pay has been essential to Title
VII's statutory goals of eradicating systemic discrimination, making
discrimination victims whole, and deterring future misconduct. Many
courts-including those with some of the toughest class certification
standards (such as the Fifth Circuit)-have concluded that an "award of
back pay, as one element of the equitable remedy, conflicts in no way with
the limitations of Rule 23(b)(2)."8' The Supreme Court has also concluded
that back pay is so important that there is presumption in its favor. 82
Moreover, because back pay awards in the Title VII context can involve
relatively uncomplicated factual determinations, comprise few
individualized issues, and be calculated on a class-wide basis, this type of
monetary relief has been regularly certified under Rule 23(b)(2).83 For
example, using an employer's own personnel data and statistics, back pay
may be calculated for each class member based on a formula that
approximates over time what salary an employee would have received but
for an employer's discrimination. Because back pay lends itself to common
proof, it does not jeopardize the cohesiveness of the class.
Unlike back pay, courts have treated requests for monetary damages
(compensatory and punitive) very differently. Damages are permitted in a
Rule 23(b)(2) class action only if they do not predominate over the
injunctive and declaratory relief sought. 84 The courts are more careful about
79. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998).
80. See id. at 415.
81. Id. at 415 (citing Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974)).
82. Id. at 409.
83. See id. at 414.
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Prior to 1991, employees had limited recourse under Title VIl.
They could pursue only equitable relief, such as injunctions, declarations, reinstatement, back pay and
front pay. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to enhance enforcement
and expand remedies. More specifically, it provided compensatory and punitive damages, and attendant
jury trials, in cases alleging intentional discrimination under Title VII. See Jost, Class Action Lawsuits,
supra note 60, at 443.
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monetary damages under the rule because of the risk that class members'
interests may diverge.85 Without notice or an opportunity to opt out of a
Rule 23(b)(2) class action, class members' interests must be aligned so as to
provide them due process. But the cohesiveness that justifies a mandatory
class action arguably starts to break down when, after a class-wide liability
finding, class members seek individual damages awards. It follows that
monetary awards involving complicated, highly individualized assessments
or hearings would go against class certification.
Because of the risk that monetary damages present to the cohesiveness
of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, courts uniformly apply a predominance test to
ensure that the class action remains primarily focused on group-wide injury
and relief.86 Consequently, the real dispute among the federal courts of
appeals has been over how to determine when monetary relief predominates
over injunctive and declaratory relief. The circuits have come up with three
different tests: the Fifth Circuit's incidental test established in Allison v.
Citgo Petroleum Corp.,7 the Second Circuit's ad hoc balancing test
established in Robinson v. Metro-North Railroad Co.," and the Ninth
Circuit's objective effects test established in Dukes.89 The Supreme Court
may take the opportunity presented in Dukes to endorse one of these
approaches or fashion its own-thereby providing much needed guidance
on the critical question of what circumstances justify mandatory class
certification involving monetary relief.
So what are the implications of the Dukes case and what access-to-
justice issues does it present for employees and other civil rights litigants?
The potential impact of the case stems not so much from the size of the
Dukes class90 as from the very survival of certain types of class actions in
areas as varied as employment, securities, anti-trust, and products liability.
85. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 412-13.
86. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 593 (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
87. 151 F.3d 402.
88. 267 F.3d 147.
89. 603 F.3d 571.
90. See Dukes, 603 F.3d at 578 n.3. The size of the class (up to as many as 1.5 million women) is
of course relevant to class certification issues under Rule 23(a), and manageability under Rule 23(b)(3)
(an alternative certification that entitles class members to notice and the right to opt out, so long as the
common issues predominate and a class action is superior to other dispute resolution mechanisms). At
issue before the Court in Dukes is whether there is a common question of law or fact between the named
plaintiffs and the class members sufficient for the case to be a class action. The plaintiffs contend that
women are disproportionately denied promotions and are underpaid for comparable work in comparison
to their male colleagues because of a corporate culture that gives store managers undue discretion when
making employment decisions. The lawsuit is premised on the theory that excessive subjectivity ena-
bled improper gender stereotyping to permeate the company, resulting in an illegal pattern or practice of
discrimination. Wal-Mart contends that there is no companywide discrimination and that there is not
sufficient commonality among the class members to bring the case as a class action.
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At issue is whether it will become more difficult for plaintiffs who seek
monetary relief for systemic misconduct to bring a class action. This is
important because for many employees, consumers and others, a class
action is their own meaningful access to the courts. If the standard for class
certification is too hard to meet, this compromises plaintiffs' ability to
eradicate systemic discrimination, to be made whole, and to deter future
misconduct.91 Moreover, class actions are important to the civil justice
system for the substantial time and cost savings they provide the court and
parties, along with numerous other advantages as discussed above. The
Dukes case has the potential of redefining the terms on which this critical
procedural device is available.
While Dukes promises to clarify the standards for class certification (at
least in the employment discrimination area), Smith v. Bayer Corp.92 aims to
establish the preclusive effect of a federal class certification ruling.9 3 More
specifically, before the Supreme Court is the question of whether putative
class members may get another bite at the apple in state court if a federal
court denies class certification first.94 In Smith, the Eighth Circuit held that
a federal court that denied class certification could preclude a similar state
court suit brought by individuals who would have been members of the
federal class action, but did not actually file the federal case. 95 The
Supreme Court will have to balance two important competing interests:
protecting the sovereignty and judgments of different court systems on the
one hand and regulating forum shopping for class certification on the
other.96 Should the Supreme Court heighten the class certification standard
in federal court under Dukes and then punctuate that with preclusive effect
91. Even if plaintiffs are able to seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), rather than Rule 23(b)(2),
this may offer cold comfort because of the former's much harder certification standard not historically
used in Title Vil cases. Under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs would have to show that common questions
predominate and that a class action is superior to all other methods for resolving the dispute. The rule
also requires plaintiffs to provide notice to the class and an opportunity to opt out. These greater costs
and burdens may prevent those with small claims and resources from bringing potentially meritorious
systemic civil rights cases altogether. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
92. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 593 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. Minn. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 61 (Sept.
28, 2010) (No. 09-1205).
93. The case was decided as this article was going to press. This article is based on remarks
made on March 20, 2011, at the 34th Annual Law Review Symposium, "Crisis in the Legal Profession,"
Carhart Program in Legal Ethics.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 724.
96. The Court wrestled with a similar state sovereignty issue in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc.,
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (holding that a state law which prohibited class actions
in lawsuits seeking penalties or statutory minimum damages conflicted with Rule 23, and therefore did
not apply to a case filed in federal court sitting in diversity).
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in Smith, plaintiffs will have an even harder time challenging systemic
corporate misconduct.
Employees like Betty Dukes in the Wal-Mart case, are already
struggling to successfully bring class actions challenging unfair
employment practices. A number of courts of appeals are raising the bar-
requiring plaintiffs to prove each element of Rule 23 by a "preponderance
of the evidence," 9 rather than by "some showing."98  Employment
discrimination class actions, already rare in federal court,99 may become
even rarer.
IV. GETTING ACCESS TO A JUDGE
Last but not least, another procedural hurdle an employee may confront
is whether he will be permitted to have his case heard by a judge or be
forced to use an arbitrator. There has been a significant increase in
arbitration agreements that require everyday Americans to give up their
right to have a judge rather than an arbitrator resolve their case, in the event
that there is a dispute. Such pre-dispute agreements, offered on a take-or-
leave it basis, have proliferated in employment and consumer contracts of
all kinds. While the lower courts have been divided over whether such
contracts of adhesion are enforceable according to their specific terms, the
Supreme Court has promoted the enforceability of arbitration agreements in
various contexts. 00 The trend over the last several decades has been to
defer to arbitration whenever possible.
Given that arbitration is simply another forum a complainant may use to
resolve a dispute, why is deference to pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
agreements an access to justice issue? It is because the court system and
97. Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co, 597 F.3d 330, 338 (5th
Cir. 2010). In Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., the Supreme Court is considering the propri-
ety of requiring plaintiffs to prove at the class certification stage that a defendant's misstatements caused
the losses claimed by investors in a securities fraud class action. The Fifth Circuit has taken the unique
position that it does-a particularly severe approach. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.,
2011 U.S. LEXIS4181 (2011).
98. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. was decided as this article was going to press.
This article is based on remarks made on March 20, 2011, at the 34th Annual Law Review Symposium,
"Crisis in the Legal Profession," Carhart Program in Legal Ethics.
99. Jost, Class Action Lawsuits, supra note 60, at 448 ("[Cjlass certification [was] granted in
only 10 of 33 employment discrimination cases filed as class actions under the federal civil rights law
from 2008 through 2010.").
100. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Is it the "Real Thing"? How Coke's One- Way Binding Arbitration
May Bridge the Divide Between Litigation and Arbitration, 2009 J. DisP. RESOL. 77, 83 (2009) ("The
Court has endorsed the use of arbitration in just about every kind of civil dispute over which a court
could have jurisdiction. The Court has interpreted the FAA as expressing a strong preference for the
private resolution of claims brought to enforce rights in areas as varied as securities, antitrust, consumer
protection and civil rights."); Id. (citing cases).
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arbitration have very different features, which may impact not only the
process but the outcome of a case. Like the federal civil litigation system,
arbitration has important advantages and disadvantages of which individuals
should be aware. For example, in comparison to the court system,
arbitration may be relatively fast, inexpensive, convenient, confidential,
flexible, and informal. It may lead to more lucrative outcomes. The cost of
these advantages, however, is high. Arbitration denies the parties the right
to a jury trial, binding precedents, and robust appellate review. Discovery,
remedies, and written opinions may be limited; costs may be high,
depending on an arbitrator's time and fees expended; and procedural
protections may be sacrificed for expediency.
Because the benefits of arbitration come with a price, it is important that
parties entering agreements to arbitrate understand and consent to such
arrangements. Mandatory arbitration can be very positive when it is the
product of knowing, consensual agreements between the parties. For
example, the Supreme Court's deference to the enforceability of arbitration
agreements in the collective bargaining context makes sense because unions
and employers negotiate with each other as equally sophisticated, powerful
repeat players. However, the problem arises when the players have unequal
bargaining power and information. For example, consumers and employees
who want a cell phone, bank account, mortgage, or job have no real
opportunity to cross out an arbitration clause that appears in a standard,
form contract. These are take-it-or-leave-it deals, where the notions of
negotiation and consent start to fall apart.
One of the most troubling features of modem arbitration agreements is
the class action ban. An increasing number of arbitration agreements state
that if an individual has a dispute in the future, he is prohibited from
bringing his grievance as a collective or class action. The standardization of
class action bans has received mixed reviews from the courts. Relying on
various rationales, some federal and state courts of appeals have held such
bans unenforceable, especially in consumer contracts involving small value
claims, while others have not. Recently the Supreme Court, in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,'01 weighed in on the enforceability of
arbitration agreements with embedded class action waivers. A T&T Mobility
merges two concerns: making sure that the class action device and the civil
justice system are available when appropriate. 102 As such, the decision
firmly sets the stage in which access to justice issues predominate.
101. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
102. See generally id.
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In AT&T Mobility, the Court was tasked with determining whether the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") preempted California's judicial rule that
classified certain class action bans in arbitration agreements as
unconscionable.'0 3 More broadly, could a state condition the enforceability
of an arbitration agreement on the availability of a class action?'" The
Court, in a 5-4 split, held that the FAA pre-empted California's law. 05
Consumers, Vincent and Liza Concepcion, purchased cell phone service
from AT&T Mobility in response to an advertisement stating they would
receive "free" phones.10 6 To their surprise, the Concepcions were charged
sales tax on the value of the "free" phones. 07 Consequently, the couple
filed a complaint in federal court in California.'0o The complaint was
consolidated with a putative class action, alleging that the company had,
inter alia, engaged in false advertising and fraud.'09 AT&T Mobility moved
to compel the Concepcions to arbitrate their claims pursuant to an
arbitration clause in their wireless service agreement."l0 The agreement,
although consumer-friendly in many ways, required them to resolve all
disputes through arbitration and banned class actions."' The federal district
court denied the motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that the class
action waiver was unconscionable and therefore, unenforceable under
California law.1 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and held that the FAA did
not preempt California law. "3  In California, a class action ban is
unenforceable if the case involves a consumer contract of adhesion, a
dispute over small amounts of damages, and an allegation that the party
with greater bargaining power tried to deliberately cheat lots of consumers
out of small monetary sums (i.e. the "Discover Bank" rule).14 In
California, if a class action waiver meets the Discover Bank criteria, the
agreement is unconscionable because it functions as an exculpatory
clause-effectively immunizing companies from complying with
103. Id. at 1746.
104. Id. at 1744.
105. Id. at 1756.




110. Id. at 1744-45.
Ill. AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
112. Id. at 1745
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1745-46 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
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California's consumer laws."t5  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine if the FAA preempted California's unconscionability rule." 6
The Supreme Court concluded that while California's Discover Bank
rule did not conflict outright with the FAA, the rule as applied
impermissibly disfavored arbitration."' 7 Therefore, the FAA preempted the
state's rule." 8 Section 2 of the FAA states that an arbitration agreement
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.""19 The statute is
meant to protect arbitration agreements from discrimination and to place
them on equal footing with other contracts. The FAA requires courts to
enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms and to protect the
freedom to contract. The statute reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration." 2 0  While the final clause of Section 2 (i.e. the "savings
clause") permits an arbitration agreement to be invalidated, this is only on
limited grounds, such as generally applicable contract defenses like fraud,
duress and unconscionability.121
The Court's description of the FAA's underlying purpose in AT&T
Mobility largely tracks precedents that have developed over the last couple
of decades. However, in concluding that the FAA preempts California's
unconscionability law, the Court goes even further, requiring arbitration
agreements to be enforced "according to their terms so as to facilitate
streamlined proceedings."l22 With this overlay, the Court concluded that
"[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent
with the FAA." 23  Building on the "fundamental" distinctions between
individual and class arbitration identified in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,124 the Court held that "class arbitration, to the
extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is
inconsistent with the FAA." 2 5
115. See id. at 1746-48.
116. AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
117. See id. at 1746-53.
118. Id. at 1756.
119. 9U.S.C.§2(2011).
120. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
121. Id. at 1746;seealso9 U.S.C. § 2.
122. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (emphasis added).
123. Id.
124. 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (holding that parties cannot be compelled to class arbitration
under the FAA where they have not agreed to do so).
125. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51.
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Despite years of successful class arbitrations by the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA"), the admitted importance of class actions
for small-dollar claims, and the application of Discover Bank's rule to
litigation and arbitration, AT&T Mobility prohibited a state from requiring
the procedure's availability. More specifically, the Court concluded that
California's law was inconsistent with, and was thus preempted by, the
FAA on three grounds: (1) a class action is incompatible with arbitration
because the former "sacrifices the principle advantage of arbitration-its
informality-and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to
generate procedural morass than final judgment[,]" (2) "class arbitration
requires procedural formality[,]" and (3) class arbitration is unacceptably
risky for defendants. 1 26  While parties admittedly have the freedom to
contract and select whatever features they would like in their dispute
resolution system; the courts, however, are bound to honor those
expectations to the extent that the parties agree to a system that no longer
resembles arbitration as envisioned by the FAA, which is a system that
cannot be required by state law.1 27
Not only is AT&T Mobility unique in its emphasis on linking FAA
preemption to whether the arbitration agreement facilitates streamlined
proceedings, the opinion is unique in its approach to federalism. The
majority-Justices known to protect federalism and to defer to states' rights
(Justices Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Alito, with Justice Thomas
concurring) 128-concluded that the unconscionability law in California is
pre-empted by the FAA. By contrast, the dissent-Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan--champions a state's right to prohibit
class action bans under an unconscionability doctrine that applies to all
contracts. 129 This switch in rhetoric suggests a significant schism in the
Court over the importance of aggregate litigation.
The Court's decision erects another significant procedural hurdle that
employees, consumers, and others will have to clear in order to bring
meritorious claims. In light of AT&T Mobility, companies are even more
likely to insert class action bans in their pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration
agreements. This means that more Davids in the world will go up against
Goliaths alone. To the extent that those with small claims and resources are
126. Id. at 1751-52.
127. Id. at 1752-53.
128. Id. at 1746. Justice Thomas concurred with the judgment on different grounds. In an effort
to remain consistent with his views on implied preemption, as expressed in Wyeth v. Levine, his concur-
rence in AT&T Mobility relies on a unique interpretation of the FAA's text. See id. at 1753-56 (Thomas
J., concurring); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
129. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1756-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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unlikely to challenge powerful corporations on their own, class arbitration
bans will function as exculpatory clauses. Where arbitration agreements are
relatively consumer and employee-friendly, individuals may enjoy being
compensated for individual wrongs. But where a systemic, companywide
problem occurs, a class action ban will shield a business from accounting
for widespread misconduct.130  And in the event that the relevant
government agency cannot fill the gap left by the lack of private
enforcement, the most egregious wrongdoing will be protected. Sheltering
corporate misconduct and guaranteeing procedural and cost advantages
were not the fundamental purposes Congress had in mind when enacting the
FAA. Instead, equalizing arbitration agreements with other contracts and
ensuring judicial enforcement were the statute's goals.
The Supreme Court's latest deference to federal arbitration is likely to
spur renewed interest in the Arbitration Fairness Act and other legislation
designed to curb mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer
and employment adhesion contracts. Given the Court's emphasis on the
importance of consent to arbitration terms-such as the availability of class
actions-it would seem especially important to ensure that parties
knowingly and meaningfully enter into arbitration agreements. With
consent as the linchpin to binding arbitration agreements, it makes sense to
focus on whether this is actually happening. Consumers and employees can
only enjoy the freedom to contract if they select a binding dispute resolution
system that reflects knowledge and consent. In the absence of these
attributes, arbitration agreements would be elevated above other contracts,
in direct contravention of the FAA.13 2
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, it is easy to overlook how civil procedural rules, interpretations,
and trends pose access to justice problems. Neutral rules and their
application can seem innocuous, if not boring. However, it is important to
recognize how and when procedural hurdles become too high-denying
litigants access not only to the court system, class actions, and judges, but
ultimately to justice itself. When this occurs, there is indeed a crisis in the
legal profession.
130. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic
or a fanatic sues for $30.").
131. See 9 U.S.C.A. § I (editor's notes).
132. AT&T Mobility applies only to arbitration under the FAA, not to arbitration agreements in
state court. State courts may still apply state law unconscionability doctrine in state court.
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